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ITLER WANTS THE
WORLD
BY
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A Series of Articles by ·the
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with a Foreword by the
Editor of " Cavalcade "
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Some of these Articles have
previously appeared in the
"Daily Express."

FOREWORD
BY MARK GOULDEN, EDITOR OF "CAVALCADE"

TUDENTS of international affairs, politic~! pundits, historians, and psychologists have already
expended oceans of ink and torrents of words
in the attempt to explain the causes that brought
Hitler 'to power in Germany.

S
, ,

Books by Dr. Hermann Rauschning:

A hundred diflerent commentators would advance'
as many differing theories on the subject, and i,t i ~
- likely that the controversy will go just as hotlyand inconclusively-until the _final audit of history
is made~

REVOLUTION OF DESTRUCTION .
HITLER SPEAKS
THE 'BEAST FROM THE ABYSS

\

. Whatever the cause, or combination of causes, the
effect is open to no doubt. The plain fact is that at
this moment in hi~tory Hitler is the unchallenged
dictator of the Third Reich.
He is something more. He stands to~day as once
Napc:ileon stood, virtually Master of Europe.
Just
how long he will ,remain so time-and the efforts of
the Allied nations-will decide.

Copyright R eserved ]
This book first published April, 194r.

But it 'is entirely . proper that while the w~rld
revolution, brought about by Hitlerism, is being
enacted, there should be an informed public opinion
about the background and the aims of National
Socialism and its supreme exponent.
Without such knowledge no tr'l}e under's tanding
-3B2

. of the deeper significance of to-dais tremendous
happenings is possible.
No one is better equipped to impart that knowledge than Dr. Hermann Rauschning. It has qeen
said of him that he is the man who knows what is in
Hitler's mind.
How true this is can be gauged by a perusal of
Dr. Rauschning's first book, "Germany's Revolution
of Destruction." It was written in 1938, and, in the
light of subsequent events, it now stands verily as a
blueprint of Hitler's plans and progress.

stance for this country. He was in a position to provide valuable information as to the true purpose of
Hitlerism. He exposed the Nazi aims, and did much
to open the eyes · of the nation to the menace of
Hitler's regime.
His writings have been of inestimable value and
importance.
Within this volume Dr. Rauschning takes ·the
study of Hitler and Nazism right up to the present
moment.

He !foretold the course of . the European drama
with uncanny accuracy. To-day the work reads
almost like a record of the things that have happened
rather than an outline of what was to come.
It is significant that Rauschning has always main- .
tained National Socialism will bring about . its own
destruction, It was for that reason he resigned the
Presidency of the Danzig Senate,, to which he WqS
a'p pointed by Hitler in the early days.

Rauschning, descend;mt of an East Psussian landowning famiiy of military caste, was, attracted to the
National Socialist movement at the time when it
seemed; as it did to many other sincere thinkers, a
solution of Germany's difficulties.
He became a member of the party. But when he
realised the . evil inherent in the system and the villainous nature of the hierarchy, he cut adrift and
b ~came its bitterest _ opponent. He had to leave
Danzig first in 1935 and definitely in 1936.
His flight to England was a fortunate_ circum-
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· Nazis' Plan to Set -the World
in Flames
HAT were the two big ideas in the German
military mind in the last war? "Verdun " and
"the elimination of the ,Russian front."
To-day the "Verdun" idea represents an attack
on the British Isles with all possible means'.
This is an 9peration with which we still h'ave to
reckon. But the other conception is by no means an
· attack on Soviet Russia.
In the last war it was the "Russian steamroller"
· and its apparently inexhaustible resources which 'induced the German General Staff to rid themselyes
of this menace before tackling the main military
objective in the West.
To-day there is no such menace and no immediate
connection between Russia and the military aims
against Britain, even though Soviet Russia ties up
strong German forces in Eastern Europe . . ·But in
another sense the German General Staff sees itself
com,Pelled to initiate preparatory operations just as
in 1915.
The second conception may therefore be said to
be represented by auxiliary operations which would
. render a later invasion an absolute knoc~out, unless
the enemy was already so war-weary that he gave
in before the final blow.
The value of these operations would be that (1)
they would not involve the same risk as the

W

,

-6-

.

-7-

•

•

NAZIS' PLAN TO SET THE WORLD IN FLAMES

NAZIS' PLAN TO, SET THE WORLD IN FLAJ.}'1ES

"Verdun" scheme, and (2) it would be possible to
break them :off a't , any -given moment and carry on
the war by- diplomatic means,
Moreover, the German propaganda gave us clear
indications on this:point several weeks ago, and it is
fairly certain that this time it said what it meant,
If Britafn was to be attacked, it stated, then the
assault would be delivered by a series of operations
similar to those directed against the Maginot Line,
There would be no question of a frontal attack; the
task would be carried out by means of a turning
movement, as with the French defences,
Does this mean that there would be no attack on
the most strongly fortified localities, Le,, on the
Channel front, but that an onslaught would be
directed against weaker points, and with new
weapons, such as gas?
,
Be sure that something on a larger and more comprehensive scale is implied,
A turning movement
against Britain and the British Empire must be
carried out on a larger scale than one which can be
estimated by purely European standards.
Thus, the German propagandist did not mean
operations planned · to turn the defences of "Britain,
but a scheme-to manoeuvre the defenders out of their
lines of defence-the destruction of the lifelines
which make the British Empire a political, military,
and economic unit.
It implies the isolation of Britain from her sources .
·of power, the deprivation Of all help from America.
It is far too comprehensive a scheme to be carried
out by means of the submarine warfare Germany has
hitherto waged in the Northern Atlantic.
An invasion of the British Isles would not bring ·

a decisive victory., The war could be carried on by
the intact British Empire, with the U.S.A. as a nucleus
of power supplies.
'
. The Germans must therefore first induce · a state
of generai attrition, in which it would be possible for
them to deliver the decisive blow.
Not until the
Empire had been weakened or even disintegrated by
a ~eries of' blows could an invasion be launched as
the crowning act which would deliver the " thrust at
the heart," leading to the enemy's .total collapse .
In this war the " ·elimination of the Russian
front,'' therefore,1implies an attack on the life-lines
of the Empire, and actions calculated to dissipate the
strength of the British forces by a series of campaigns
in widely separated parts of the Empire.
It also implies the weakening of American ass1stance by_ a diversion of resources to· zones vital for
the U.S.A.
.
.
•
Britain cannot be beaten until America!s help is
eliminated. Consequently the U.S.A. gives the
German General Staff to-day the same cause for un- ·
easiness that Russia did in the last war. In fact, we
can already see on the horizon the. outlines of vast
operations calculated to divert and dissipate Jhe
British war effort.
The war is about to enter a universal phase.
Within a short time we may see it spread over the
whole earth, thus becoming a "world war" in a far
truer sense than the last one, wQ.ich was mainly
a European war, with a number of minor operations
elsewher·e.
The advantages of such a scheme for Hitler may
be found in the fact that he would have the benefit
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of operating on inner lines over a considerable pa~t
.o f the theatre of war,, while his aHy, Japan, would
be equally well placed in another sphere of action.
Meanwhile, •a large part of Britain's man-power
would be tied up in the British Isles. Britain would
also be exposed to the danger of dissip~ting her
forces, ·e specially her sea and air arm.
She would be faced with the alternative of either
weakening her .main defences or endeavouring to
meet assaults with insufficient defence power in ot?er
important parts of the Empire.
The belligerent who can secure the initiative at
this phase of the war and maintain it over a long
period is in a position to derive great advantages
from surprise attacks at all· points ,and manoeuvre
his opponent into immobility and dissipation of
forces .,
•
,
In no phase of the war does the init~ative count
for .so much as in the present one.
_
It is highly probable that this new phase will
begin with a surprise blow by Germany. But then
Germany's initiative would onJy be a · sham. For
several months Britain and her allies have had the
initiative, and consequently Germany's next move
can only be a reaction and not an original action.
We must, however, presume that Germany will
begin a series of actions in which she can make use
of new allies. 'T he probability of Japan's active participation in the war has increased during the last .
few weeks, and it is not out of the question that Spain
.may a.lso come in.
But Germany hopes to gain a decisive effect if she
-
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can s.u cceed in conclu-Oing a military alliance with •
Russia and exploiting her as a real ally.
Russia's present precarious situation (the same
military encirclement at all decisive points which
threatened Poland in 1938-39) might induce Stalin to
decide in favour of a military alliance with National
Socialism while refraining from imitating the unfortunate part played by Colonel Beck. He would
strive to participate in Germany's successes for as
long as possible, and avoid a German attack on his
own territory.
Therefore~ a Russian drive towards Iran and the
Mesopotamian area is as much to be reckoned with as
a t}:ireat to Afghanistan.
Such operations would provid~ Germany with a
new trump card against Turkey, and a new pair of
pincers to replace the broken Egyptian and Balkan
ones.
Turkey would be threatened from both east and
west, while the entry of Spain into the war could
initiate a new phase of operations in the Western
Mediterranean and on the Atlantic coasts.
We should then see many new and quickly changing theatres of war. They would include a Balkan
theatre of war and an.East Mediterranean one, witb. a
struggle for the Aegean Sea, the communications
with As ia Minor, and a fight for the Suez Canal.
Furthermore, there would be operations in: the
Persian Gulf and the Mosul area, with new bases
for the U-boats.
Besides these, we should have a Malayan theatre
of war, which could tie up considerable fornes of both
the British Empire and the U.S.A.
l
-
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.
Meanwhile

the North African theatre of war
would remain in ex1stence, and perhaps be galvanised into new 1ife by the landing of German and
Italian forces.
A Western Mediterranean theatre of war would
be created in the area bounded by Sicily, Sardinia,
Southern Spain, Tunis, 'and Morocco. Here it might
be possible to establish submarine bases and airports
in Vigo and gn the west coast of Africa. · Perhap,s
there. would be a struggle for the possession of Gibraltar.
But these operations would not exclude more mtensive warfare over the British Isles.
·
Preparatory operations for a later _invasion woµld
take place, and they would not be directed solely on
the destruction of the British war industries but also _
· on the' drawing of an inner circle round the island.
There would perhaps be actions against Iceland
· and the Orkneys and even' ·against Ireland. · J?,u t
meanwhile naval warfare would take place on all
the seven seas, and perhaps extend to -a vniversal
threat to all the Empire's lines of communication.
A fantastic plan, which would hardly appear to be .
capable of realisation. But H!tler's aim is not merely
to achieve decisive succe.sses in every sphere of operations, but to occupy permanently and strengthen
certain key positions.
Hitler will imitate in the military field the political
tactics he _has pursued for the last eight years. He
will seek to cause unrest by means of propaganda, and
exploit the political disintegrating forces in all other.
countries.
If he decides to wage the war of this phas~ as . a
-
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campaign for calJsing disturbance and unrest everywhere and as a grotesquely intensive 'g uerilla · war
accompanied by surprise successes, then he might
accomplish his purpos~ of wearing down and aiverting Britain's main resources in the British Isles.
B'ut he is exposed to similar risks. Even the most
daring combinations of land and air forces and the
advantage of inner lines and new poiitic~l ~lliances
cannot give him a mobility equal to that of the British
- Navy.
The weakness of his scheme lies in the uncertainty
and hazardousness of his enterprises and in thE: possibility of µn~xpected developments arising from unfbreseen. contingencies.
'
An un~xpected resis~ance, similar tc, that put up ·
by the Greeks, might cause him severE: reverses.
Germany's allies constitut~ another weakness.
Situations similar to that prevailing in Italy might
arise which might exhaust German strength in
assisting forlorn hopes.
·
Here, too, we 'may see signs of developments
similar to those which took place i?- the last war.
Although the German Press boasts that there will
be no repetition of Ludendorff's mistakes of the last
war, Le., di?·s ipation of strength in various theatres of
war, they are reckoning without their host.
'
'
Ludendorff did not undertake these many ·subordinate operations volunt1:1rily, ~ut, because he was
'forced into them by strategic, political, and economic
necessities. ·
.
.
The greatest weakness·es of this scheme, however,
will be found in the fact that it leaves the best qualities of Germany's fighting forces unexploited.
-
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In enterprises such as these the armoured divisions could be used only to a very restricted extent.
One day Germany's armies might be overtaken by
the fate which befell the Maginot Line. All the new
armaments of the German nation might be shown up
as illusory.
But it does not seem credi ble that Germany
would voluntarily renounce the use of her best instruments. Will she not be concerned to find new
tasks for her armoured divisions and mechanised
units.
Yet another argument crops up. If there is to be
a war of attrition,. as these large-scale diversion man·oeuvres forecast, can Hitler hold out longer than
Britain and the U.S.A.? Will he not run short of
. petrol, to say nothing of other ra~ materials?
During the last war it was Luden,dorff who found
himself forc~d, by shortage of petrol and corn, to
undertake risky adventures in Southern Russia and
the Caucasus just at the time when he was engaged
in the decisive campaign in the west.

'

,

•'
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Hitler

1s

Playing for a Draw

NE German illusion has been destroyed. It is ,
the illus,i on tha! Hitler's political superiority
has enabled' him to avoid a war on several
fronts, while his military superiority has enabled him
to avoid a w.ar ·o f 'positions, i.e., of fixed fronts.
In reality, Germany nas beeri for ced to employ a
large part of her fighting forces in masked position
warfare on several fronts .
This position warfare assumes a totally diffe;rent
aspect from the trench warfare of 1914-18 with which
we are fam'iliar. It is bloodless. But it also wastes
German strength and weakens the morale ,of the German forces. It restricts mobility and the possibility
of concentrating large masses for operational pu_i:_poses.
It is characteristic of this position ·w arfare that its
negative ·effects operate almost exclusively to Germany's disadvantage.If this is the cas,e, it is an important factor in helping us .to form an opinion of Hitler's. plans, and the
plans which he could still evolve with some prospect
of success. It would s ignify that his power of initia.t ive is very limited.
Perhaps he might lose it altogether and be forced
to resort to ,defensive strategy .
It, might signify that despite Greater Germany's
immense reserves .of man-power she is no longer in a

0
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position to mobilis,e sufficient forces for several simultaneous operations or for certain enterprises.
There are, indeed, certain strategic tasks which
cannot be carried out by armies consisting mainly of
armoured divisions, motorised units, and aircraft.
This fact gives us a new criterion for an eS!timation of the remainder of the operations which
National Socialism threatens to undertake. ·It can
make"it easier for us to distinguish between bluff and
genuine intentions.
For example, is Hitler still in a position to effect a
military occupation of Unoccupied France and at the
same time to despatch sufficient troops to save Italy
from collapse, initiate an offensive against Turkey
and Greece, and yet keep in reserve the forces which
have been tral.ned for an invasion of Britain?
If it is really true that Germany is ·e ngaged in
masked position warfare on several fronts, we should
find it easier, to ascertain the directions in which to
look for National Socialist weak spots.
What forces are at Hitler's disposal? No authentic
figures are available, but perhaps we may answer
this question m _a modified form, ·i.e., what forces
must be at Hitler's disposal in order to give him the
s,trategic mobility to which, he lays
· '
. .claim?
. Germany must have possessed a total strength of ·
7,500,000 men, of whom 2,300,000 constituted armies
of occupation with little fighting value, while another
'2,600,000 formed elite corps of excellent quality for
offensive operations.
·
She must have had at least thjrty armoured . and
motorised divisions and must have been in a position ,
!o mobilise another 3,500,000 men for employment of
16 -
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only an indirectly military nature (technical and
political personnel, S.S., Gestapo, ~tc.) :
This means that Germany must have mobilised a
t?tal of eleven million men for war purposes, exclusive of those required for industrial and administrative purposes.*
Despite the collapse of France and the consequent
acquisition of better coastal positions for her war
against Britain, Germany is in a strategical situation
which is .far more unfavourable for her than the one
in which she found herself in 1917 after the elimination of Russia.
·
·
Despite the Russo-German Pact there is to-day a
Russian front which engages about 1,500,000 of Germany's fighting men and the greater part of her
armoured divisions.
The formations thus absorbed could not become
available elsewhere even in the event of a RussoGerman military alliance, because the two partners
would not t:ust one another . . 1
Likewis·e , it is impossible to weaken the invasion
forces in the coastal regions to any great extent, becaus·e German propaganda has repeatedly characterised them as. a line of defence, and Germany knows
full well that Britain might later be in a position to
under.take a counter-offensive and occupy strategically u:µportant points.
Despite certain Press reports, Germany would be
bar·ely able to employ forces of 650,000/men and five
. armoured division for operations in Bulgaria ·and
Turkey.
*The .autho~ is not in .a ip osition to dfe the reason
whereby he arrives .at these figures .

-

17

~

DI

HITLER IS PLAYING FOR A DRAW

' ·

Finally, we have to consider the question of
strategic reserves, and . they would appear to be insufficient for ' the difficult strategic tasks they would
have to undertake. They may be reckoned as be-·
tween thirty an<l forty-fiv~ divisions with something
'like double this number of half-trained year classes,
but large-scale operations in the near future would
involve immense wastage, so that these reserves
could only be used as replacements for losses.
By- the extenion of his invisible front Hitler has ,
become involved in the situation . which he and his
generals have striven to avoid. I~ is one in which a
decision will be attained by means of mass armies
rather than the operations of highly trained shock ··
t,roops.
.
A national army, of the type _prevailing ih the
nineteenth century, is dominated by a . so-called
"minimum law,'' i.e., a lciw which regulates the
potential achievements of an army by the performance of its worst rather than its best troops.
The German High Command knows well enough
that if masses go into action it will become apparent
that the German people have no more enthusiasm
for the war than .the French and Italian nations have
evinced.
This is a fact which National Socialist upbringing
is powerless to alter.
In these circumstances it looks as if the German
Higher Command will be forced to economise.
Can it undertake operations of an unlimHed scope?
-These are the problems which would confront
Gerrr{any if she attempted to occupy. all Spain arid
Portugal or even only Gibraltar and Vigo-a task far
-18-
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ir}:ore difficult thari the occupation of the remainder

of France or the detachment of troops to assist Italy.
. In these circumstances, can Germany carry out a
plan which lies within the framework of her policy
and strategy, i.e., the overrunning of Turkey, .the
.occupation of Iran, and a thru's t to the Persian Gulf?
· All these aims, even if considered . separately,
w_o uld seem to be beyond the power of National
Socialism. They contain the risk pf developing a gap .
on one or other too widely extended fronts.
May we not therefore ass·ume that German troop
movements in three different .regions have a political rather than a military purpose?
·
The German military favlts are an exaggerated ·
expenditure of energy in forward thrusts and an exhausting pace of forward movements.
These are '
coupled with an exaggerated. importance attached to
territorial gains.
Faith
qu1ck successes is one of the typical
_faults of German strategy. It leads to a strategic
dispersal of troops, even id' the individual thrusts are
carried out with the utmost conc~ntration of forces.
Consequently, ·t he successes achieved are often
ipusory.
Despite all 'his spectacular successes in the early
. summer of last year, Hitler . did not achieve the
strat_egic aim of his campaign. .
_/
It is the opinion of many that a German attempt
, at invasion in July and August of last year would
have had the gFeatest chances of success.
. The unexpected British resistance robbed him of
the !fruits of victory.
His o~iginal plan of'campaign broke down, and he

tn
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needs a new one. Can there be any .doubt as to its
nature? . Is the invasion of Britain not the only plan
which would serve the purpose of National Socialism?
He may doubt whether this is so self-evident. Hitler faces the same - problem which confronted the
German High Command in the late autumn of 1914,'
when the November hostilities ended by leaving the·
war static in long lines of trenches.
To-day, as in those days, the High Command finds
itself ~orced to envisage a long war of attrition.' Today, a:s in th~se days, there is a differ~nce of opinion on decisive points.
One school of thought advocates a plan which we
may agree with Clausewitz* in describing as a
"thrust at the he'art" of the enemy's power. _
This implies an O!lSlaught on the strongest bulwark of the enemy's defence, which, if successful,
would end the war with one blow. ·n is the
" Verdun " conception . . . a forceful solution orf
the problem without counting the '.cost which a long
war would avoid.
The other school of thought seeks to discover ,the
weak point of the enemy's dispositions where a •
material success seems likely.
It advocates postponement. of the decisive bli)W
until the completion of prepar'atory actions which
would admit of a protracted war' if events took an
unfavourabl~ turn. These would afford possibilities
to eliminate opponents one after the other.
It refuses to stake everything on- one card and
endeav.ours to attain the possibility of achieving the
final dedsioµ with the utmost concentration of forc~s!
* The German who laid down the principles 'for the
Ka1iser's " ib litz," which failed.
- 20 -:-
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~hu~ r~du~ing the risk~.

This is the conception of-the.

of the Russian front"
.· ehmmat10n
We know that this second school of thbught gained
.

t?e upper hand in 1914-15. It did not bring the de- sired complete success.
' ·
~he "elimination of the Russian front" which
per~itt~d a' "thrust at the heart" of the 'western
Allies did not take place until 1918, when the German
forces were approaching a state of exhaustion . . Th~ · ·
thrust developed into Germany's total defeat.
. It is highly probable that ·after the failure of
his preparatory actions against Britain in the late
sum~er of last year Hitler grasped the situation aiid
re~hsed that, from a ni.ilitary point of view, the best
he could _achieve y.rould be a draw.
He can resign him.s elf to it ·with greater co~
placency than Imperial Germany could in the last
v:ar, because it affords him great political opportunities for future action
, In view . of such. con;iderati~ns, what purpose
would be served by a suicidal attack on the British
Is1es?
·
It is ~ighly _ i~probable that Hitler's great plan
of can_ip~ign fo: this year will begin with an invasion

of B~itam,
t~an it was

which has become a more difficult task
last :year, even though he has gained the
time for methodical preparations.
On t~e other hand, the " ~limin1!_tion of Russia "
conception promise.s him decisive effects even if it
entails a miHtary draw. ~
'
. But. the idea of a draw merits just as much con~ider~t10n as a military ·a nd political danger as an
mvasion has received.
.
-21-
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Russia is Hitler's Plum
T is a popular_belief that time is working agai_nst
Hitler. Not long ago the utterances of an important man _gave him fifteen -months within
which he must win the war or face defeat. The argument following on that belief is that, since he is well
aware of the time-limit, there is only one way out of
his dilemma-an invasion .of Britain.
But the situation is not quite so simple. as that.
Hitler and the men behind him have shown themselves capable of great blun~ers .. But they have also
demonstrated that they give very careful consideration to their individual actions.
_
Would it therefore not be the immediate aim of
the German High Command to endeavour to gain a
longer time-limit and so avoid being placed in a situat.i on in which ev·e rything has to be staked on a s_ingle
card?
, A belligerent who has susfail}ed a· heavy reverse
may be in a position to ·undertake new military operations after the lapse of weeks or months, but it would
be very ·difficult for him to set about the conquest of
new , territories containing necessary oil and corn
supplies . at such a psychologically un_favourabJe
moment.
Hitler needs oil. Of that there is no doubt. He
cannot draw adequate supplies from his synthetic oil
plants and from the Rumanian oil wells, especi~lly as
the latter could be destroyed with comparative ease.

I
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His need of other raw materials likewise forces
him to seek a way out of the blockade.
Tbere is a way out which, if taken in time, will
render him independent of ·the adverse time-limit.
That i_s, if he can become self-sufficing in the most
essential raw materials to an extent which will enable
him to pool all Europe's industrial potentialities ..
Then he need no longer- £.ear t}J.e combination of
the British and American industrial war efforts and
the future flood· of American arms. 1
Practical e_x perience has shown that there is little
prospect of making up the necessary quantities of
corn and oil by means of commercial agr,eements with
the. Soviet Union
The Soviet Union ne·e ds its oil for irs own l!Se, a~d
cannot supply sufficient quantities to Germany with- _
out facing a breakdown of its mechanised .agr:icul-·
tural 'industry.
.
.
We might, therefore., see a repetition of the situation ~n 1917-~8, ~hen Ludendorff proceeded to occupy
Russian terntones in order .tq make sure of acquiring
the corn and oil he required.
If Hitler should decide that an alliance with
Russia is less important than the acquisition of corn
and oil, or if he should consider hims~lf able to dispense with Russian military assistance, oi if Russia
should ·reject a proposal iior a military ailiance an
offen~iv~ ~~ainst the· So:r~et- Unfon would bring him
certam m1htary and political advantages in addition
to the corn and oil he needs.
·
· For this reason a diversion of German policy to a
knock-out blow against Russia was deemed to be
within the bounds of possibility as far back as last
summer.
-
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But·there~re-0ther consideratiQns in favour of this
attack on Russfa, -As r~aders will remember, th~y
were depicted fifteen yea~s ago in Hitler's " M~m
Kampf" as the decisive operation for German worl~
supremacy after the defeat of France.
The Ger:qian war machine has been planned for
the vast Continental spaces__,_
Ludendorff was wont to say that against Russia
and on Russian soil all military operations would be
successful.
Another utterance maintained that in a future wa~ _
Germany could defeat Russia in a~ many we,e ks as
she had needed months in, the last war.
• Undoubtedly an offensive against Russia offers
Hitler very favourable prospects. From the bases
acquired by bloodless methods last winter he could
launch a pincers movement which would have an
· almost mathematical certainty Qf success.
The only' obstacles in a drive from Rumania to
Baku and Georgia would be rivers, which have lost.
much of their former importance qS military lines of
defence because o~ the use of easily assembled
pontoon bridges.
.
He would avoid the waste of time entailed by the
campaign in western Russia in 1914-15, which proved
so costly in casualties.
In fact, he would begin at th~ point reached by
the Germans in 1917. .
If we can credit ~ertain information which has
reached us, he has already stationed special forces in
the extreme north of Norway, while we may note
. that recently German-Finnis~ relations have grown
visibly warmer.
·
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w_e may also state that the :s oviet Union, which
was obviously spared a German onslaught last year
. on account of Britain's surprising resistance, has al:.
ready giv·e n away its best line of defence.
'
This is a line running from the Rumanian mountain chain to the Iron Gq__te on the Danube and thence
through Jugo.:s1avia to the Adriatic.
The liV:ely activity infused into the creation of a
Fifth Column-.in Russia is proof that German policy
and strategy still envisage acquisition of Georgia and
the Ukraine.
Although it is unn~cessary to give serious belier'
to the tales of Ukrainian peasants who hide Hitler's
portrait behind their icons, it cannot be' denied that
the dissatisfaction with the Sovtet r·e gime which prevails in certain areas would be of great assistance to
the invaders.
But the decisive factor is to be sought in the
political , reliability of the Russian !High Command
rather than in its military qualities, i.e., the extent
to which the ·Russian army is permeated with sympathis~rs of National 1
Socialism.
There can be no doubt that in the younger circles
of the" technocracy" (including, nf course, the army
• officers) there is much sympathy and admiration for
German skill and organisation capacity.
In addition to great spectacular suc~esses, Hitler
might also gain just what he needs for the sustaining
-of German morale after a difficult winter.
If certain symptoms of over-centralisation and lack of initia'tiv·e on the part of officials employed in
all branches of Russia's vast civil and military
machinery lead to rev·e rses, there is ground for fear
_;, 25 -
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of th~possihilities of breakdowns in the lines of communications, in the supply departments and in the
technical side of military op~rations.. ·
These would soon lead to chaos.
Any 'objections to the possibility of a German
attac~ on Russia are not to be sought in doubts' of
its success, but in the question of Hitler's ability to
carry the German people with him in yet another
change o'f political front.
This question can be answ~r.ed unreservedly in
the affirmative. ' Competent ·Opinions -in Germany
came to the conclusion long ago that Hitler has been
foroed to abandon his initial tactics of always isolating one battlefront. -In any case a " blitzkrieg "
against Russia would eliminate tl).e long-standing
German-Russian front by producing in Russia a state
of chaos which would free Germany's back, as it did
in 1917.
This is the one large-scale enterprise which can
be undertaken without placing an over-great strain
on the already depleted man-power reserves .
The same cannot be said of operations in ~Turkey
or the Balka'n s or of combined land and sea operations in the Ea$tern Mediterran.ean.
The annexation of vast ·e xpanses of Soviet territory and the restriction of European Russia to the
areas comprised · in the ancient Grand Duchy of
Moscow would a'iso enable Hitler · to convince the
German masses that for all practical purposes Ger-many could never be forced to sue for peace. · The Germans would only need to sit still and invite their enemies to ejeet them from their
European possessions-if they could!
-2li-
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.. ~o sum up: Once in possession of unlimited quantities of corn and oil, secure from all attacks on the
Continent ·~x'ce_pt by way of the air and with lines
of retreat ·e xtending to beyond the Ural M6untains
would not National 'Socialism be invincible? . What
alt~rnative would the enemy have except a draw
which would leave Hitler in possession of all his
conquests?

'·
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The Blow at the Heart
ITLEE 'does not rely o~ a single plan of action
for his future operations.
In ~act, he ha~
s':::!veral plans, framed to meet ·various eventu. alities.
.
Surprises and elasticity of action .will be the mam
features of bis forthcoming .campaign. But, c:bove
all he will make sure of his lines of retreat into ter~i
to;ies where he is for ' all practical purposes·unassail,
•
able.
He will never sue for peace, and we should do well
to believe his protestations .to this effect.
Like a modern King Charles of Sweden, he wjll
prefer to retir·e to the regions of ea1>tern Russia ~nd.
central Asici with that part of his armies which
remains faithful to him, and establish there a war- .
rior kingdom on. the lines of those founded by the
Normans.
Hitler's plan will not he determined by ~he in~u
ence of one or another scheme, but by a considerat10n
of all possibilities. He will act according to the developments of the situation. But for us the danger
of invasion will remain.
Perhaps he will attempt it when all other efforts
to break the British resistance have failed.
· In such an event the German mentality would
regard an invasion a_s a typical "short circuit" solution, as a last and higheS1t trump card, or as a desperate effort. .

H
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_ But in itself 'an invasion need not necessarily be
an act of despair. .If well prepared in adva11ce by
attrition of the enemy's moral and material resources,
and by the concentration of all German sources. of
power at one point, SiUCh an enterprise would rather
correspond to what Clausewitz calls the "thrust at
the heart" in his military writings.
The Ge~man strategist always regarded. such an
operation as the culminatfon of a plan of campaign
ahd the decisive action which broke the enemy's
power finally.
From this standpoint an invasion need not be ·
regarded as a reckless undertaking which stakes
.everything on one card, but rather as the m~thodical
preparation for a strategic situation which would
·e nable the invader 'to gain a complete victory by
means of a single isolated thrust.
ProbaJ:>ly the enemy would start by massing all
hiS offensive resources on one -point in order to cause
a general paralysis by the shock of his first assault.
This is shown by the break through in France,
where all the subsequent operations of the Allies
failed to stem the disaster caused by the initial blow.
, Consequently · we should not ·,be permitted · to
accustom ourselves gradually to increasing terrors, as
happened last year, but we should have to face ' the
sudd:en concentrated employment of all resources the
enemy can bring to bear on us.
Possibly there might be an initial phase during
·which he would endeavour to win better bases from
which to launch .his attack, by drawing an inner circle -. round the British Isles. ·
The outer one consisit s of the Channel coastal
regions, Bel~ium, Holland, Fraf!ce, Norway, and the
-
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Atlantic Ocean. The inner one at which he must aim
would· be bounded by Iceland, the Orkneys, a:r:d perhaps Irela~d.
We may also el{.visage further preparatory action
in the creation of yet a third and inil1ost circle com-,
prising parts of the British'. Islesi which he could con~
triye to occupy. But it is possible that H~tler would
dispense with all preliminary action and 'launch his
~decisive offensive in the form of a masised assault,
with the i~tention of securing a foothold at some
point from which furtlier attacks could be developed.
It woulO be out of place to discuss the possibilities of success tfor such an enterprise. But perhaps
we might do y.rell to recall a blunder Hitler has repeatedly committed ..
On the eve of the executiop of a plan which .has
been thoroughly worked out he has frequently
thrown it over and improvised a new one, thus creating confusion and impairing his chances of success.
The prototype of this blunder may be found in
the assassination of Dollfuss in 1934. '
We shall find another weak point in the !fact that
Hitler no longer has the freedom of choice which was
his in 1939 and 1940, when he executed his prearranged plans wi:thout obstr,u ction by any counteractions on the part of his opponents.
To-day the situation is complete_ly different. He
has been forced to adapt himself to the moves of his
·opponents . . He must change his plans continually.
In all probability his attempts to divert his opponents'
forces rriay result in ·the dispersal of his own. His
forc·es are strained to the utmost; but he will put a
further heavy stra'in on them.
Hitler's greatest weakness, however, ·is his lack
1
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of a navy equal to the British Navy. ·Neither the
I~alian nor the Japanese Navies c;ould make up' for,
his deficiency.
·
It is highly improbable that ,he will ,get possession
of the French Fleet. · Con.s equently, he faces the
danger of losing the initiative in the course of an
invasion, even if his forces should suffer no decisive
reverse.
Let us recapitulat e the action possibilities open
to Hitler:·
.
1. Di version and immobilisation of . enemy forces
in various theatres of war in different parts of the .
world. Cutting of communication lines of the British
Empire and oc;cupatiorr of important key points.
2. A peace offensive, which would enab'le him to
disintegrate the enemy's morale by means of effective slogans.
·
'
3. An attack on Ru ssia and :the establishment of
a continental area in which National Socialism would
be practically .unassailable.
4. Invasion of Britain.
Of these four only the second ·and third cah be regai:ded as hopeful for him and dangerous for Britain.
We may expect ·his decision very soon; until then '
our s~ogan must be : "Be prepared for anything! "
The firsl stages-of his new move will make it easy
for us to discern the-pattern of his new campaign and
the lines on which it will proceed.
• Here, however, we must bear in mind the import- ance attached to feints by- German tacticians. The
G~rman General Staff wil~ give bad marks to any
plan of campaign which does not include at least one
feint.
-31-
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• The real purpose of a drive towards Salonika
might be an attempt to force Greece to con:elude
peace, but equally it might be the preliminary to a
large-scale operation in the Eastern Mediterranean
area.
We must, therefore, be cautious in our interpretation of individual moves because they may be
capable of various constructions.
But the fact that Britain has the military initiative
at present has induced a decisive change in the
general basic s~tuation. If she can maintain it Hitler's plight will soon become a sorry one, in spite
of his superiority in land forces.
This does not, however, imply the downfall of
his regime. We must look for the real danger in the
-political. rather than fn the military sphere, i.e., 1n
the skilful launching ad: a peace propaganda aiming
at a draw.
There is only one means of defence against Hitler's peace offensive. Without the myth (this word
must be used deliberately as an indication of the
need to stimulate spiritual·and imaginative forces) of
a future reconstruction of Europe it will be impos1 sible to keep resistance powers permanently alive ·in
such a hard struggle ..
Wle may expect Hitler's future peace offensive to
assume a different character from that displayed by
all other enterpr~ses Olf this nature.
It will not be constituted by a peace offer but by
a constant propagand~ bombardment, accompanied
by acts of military terrorisation. •
The same. basic fact holds good for both military
and political warfare. Defence is not enough, it is
the attack that decides the issue.
-
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His Secret Weapon 1s Peace
I'TLER and his generals are not ignorant' of the
weaknesses of the German situation. His
efforts will therefore be directed towards a
fundamental change in the situation ~ather than
strictly limited objectives.
.
.
But it 1s open to question whether the German
High Command can effect this ·fundamental change
~y purely military methods. Even w-day its act~ons
are dictated by the enemy, and so Hitler may be compelled to try, against his will, risky thrusts against us.
He may therefore attempt to effect the fundamental change by political methods in preference to
military ones. Before the Polish campaign he always
achieved his greatest successes with his policy of

H

fait accompli.

It would therefore be conformable to his trend of
thought to conceive the idea of a fait accompli of
peace.
- .
It might be possible, he would imagine, to render
Britain:s war against the "New Ord:er" in Europe
useless by inducing all allied and occupied countries,
and those already drawn into the NaUonal Socialist
sphere of inter·est, to agree to his · peace ter'ms, and
declare their acceptance' of a European solidarity of
interests from which all extraneous Powers would
be excluded.
It is not inconceivable that Hitler would win over
the small !States and also Italy, France, and Spain to
.

'~
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this project, and strengthen France and Spain in their antagonism 'to Britain. .
·
So long as the present French regi~e remains in
power then~ can be no question of any similarity of
British and French war aims. If France does not become an actuaL opponent of Britain at least she will ·
be. resolved to pursue a more inde12enderit policy.
There can be no further question of a comi;non
Entente policy.
We might indeed interpret the situation in the
sense that .t he three Latin Powers are vitally interested in seeing that neither Hitler nor Britain should
win a decisive victo.r y over the other.
'E urope is a balance of great cultural Powers
which gives scope for var ious combinations, and ,i f
the line of the new Fr·e nch policy -is ·opposed to a
German or Russian hegemony of Europe, it is equally - .
antagonistic to a British one.
Hence th_e new P.oint's of contact with Italy and
Spain. Moreover, this policy is the only oll"e which
· gives Mussolini a chance to save something of his
regime.
Whether such a policy will serve the real interest
of France is anqther question. It is also doubtful
whether it can be realised.
French policy now seems to assume soine resemblance to the ·'Russian policy in favouring a draw, in
preference to the victory of one or other opponent.
But that fs just what Hitler desires, and therefore
he will raise no objections to this Latin bloc; on the
contrary, he will be able to use it f.~r his o~n ends.
It would be qttite in accordance with Hitler's
" -
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trend of thought to force a peace on Britain against
'her will.
.
His estimation of public opinion in Britain and the ·
U.S.A. leads him 'to c:cmclude that a moder.ate peace,
achieved by negotiation, would revive the isolation
·tendencies latent in both Anglo..:Saxon Powers.
Moreover N atfonal Socialist drcles closely in
to~ch with the Fuhrer are largely inspired by the
idea of a revolution in the U.S.A. In the opinion
of these experts this could easily be. set in mofion if
the United States should choose to meddle in
European quarrels 9nce again.
.
· But what' Hitler r<;!ally desires to achieve by a
fait accompli peace is the basis ·for a new propaganda
campaign, which would disintegrate Anglo-Saxon
morale as surely as his slogans broke the French
morale last year.
•
It is the airri of Hitler's political warfare to d~stroy
the pathos of the war. It was with simple but effective slogans that he broke the morale of the French
forces aiid dvilian population.
He needed no artistic radio plays or literary ideas.
His propaganda 'was effective because he had already
created the political premises for it.
· 'The political premises for his new disintegration
attempts wil1 be found in repetitions of-'his willingness to conclude a negotiated peace. They will find
fruitful soil in easily awakened doubts concerning
the necessity and possibility of continuing the warin a cleavage of public opinion on this point.
An attack on Russia, for example, .could give him
a good: start, becau~e the surprise at this· une.xpect_ed
turn of events would cause.. many people to revise
their opii'-i.ion of him.
-
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If Hitler is really oU:r bulwark against Bolshevism,
they would argue, why make war on him? ·
But even this dramatic move woulq be unnecessary for his purpose, since the 'present situation
affords him possibilities of effective peace propaganda.
.
He has repeatedly sought to make it clear to
neutral diplomats and other distinguished visitors
that he has never desired war with the British Empire
and that he would regard its destruction as a world
calamity. His professed readines~ for peaceful cooperation with the British Empire on such a basis
would always find new channels of communication.
Moreover, as in all Hitler's' utterances, ther~ is a
grain of truth_ in his statement that he has never
sought war with Britain or the British Empire.
This is not merely due to the fact that his backers
made it a condition that he should avoid· complications with Britain and the U.S.A. when they advocated the Chancellorship for him. Nor because he
fears the inexhaustible resources of the British
Empire.
The real r:eason is rather to be sought in the desire
of leading circles in Germany to eschew any e~ter
prise likely to hold up the disintegration of the British
Empire, which tbey deem inevitable, and lead to a
regeneration of the British·nation.
To understand this trend of thought aright we
must rem·ember that it was not only the Prussian
military caste but the Swabian Schiller who extolled
war as a regenerator of life.
A - war-so argue others besides ·the , National
' Socialists-would regenerate all the power instincts
and martial virtues of the British nation, which
-
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appeared to have degenera~ed before the outbreak of
hostilities.
Far from hastening the break-up of the British
Empire, a war would tend to strengthen it and prolong British hegemony, at least for another two or
thr ee gep.erations. In well-informed· circles (and not
merely German ones) the Jife of tbe British Empire
was estimated at another _generation.
The weaknesses of its ruling classes made the dissolution of this " artificial c~eation" inevitable. Why,
then, provoke a revival of liJfe and resistarn~e power
by a war?' That is the real meaning of Hitler's
declara.t ions of friendship for Britain
The one focus-point of his policy is therefore his
belief in the irrevocable passing of B.ritish world
supremacy and the call to Germany to assume the
inheritance.
·
' His other focus-point was-and still .is-the
elimination ,of his Continental rival, Russia, with
whom a Germany rising to a position of world power
could never remain in permanent alliance, because
there can be only one supr·e me Power in control of
the Eurasia·n continent. ·
1While 'Britain ·c an therefore be left to a gradual
process of disintegration, the Slavonic race must be
destroyed by force befor·e it becomes a real menace
to German world domination.
'
The sudden collapse of such a great institutiOn as
the British Empire would also contain certain dangers
for the victorious destroyer.
·The aim of National Socialism is not the negative
one comprised in the destruction of the British
Empire but the extension of its own domination over
•

-

37 -

HIS SECRET WEAPON IS PEACE

·-

its essential component parts. A victory in the field
would not prevent the fr'u~ts falling into alien hands.
In the ev·e nt of a break-up of the Empire Russia,
·Japan and the U:S.A. would be in a.position to anner
valuable territories,
Probably National Socialism would be forced to .
yield most of the overseas territories to other Pow:ers,
in which case Germany would be thrown back mto
her constricted Continent~l situation.
·
It is possible that in ·the early stages of his development Hitler may have thought only in Continental terms, but by now it has become clear to him
that world domination· implies territories abutting
on the oceans and domination ·of those oceans.
Hitler desires a world empire, and not merely a .
Continentaf empire.
Similar considerations formerly
prevented
National !Socialism from attempting a spectacular
" man;h on Berlin,'' and induced it to substitute the
notion of gaining_power by means of a back-door
assumption of government, and a slinking into key
positions from which partne.r s could be ousted at a
convenient moment.
During this pr·e sent conflict Hitler has still clung
tenaciously to his idea of avoiding war to the knife
with Britain, and employing political means to
wriggle out of hostilities by a fait accompli peace.
If the process of the British Empire's disintegra~
tion can be thus continued, he will argue, i.n a way
which will let its fruits fall into his lap, and if this
process can be hastened; then it would be better to
employ political methods which would tempt British
commercial instincts ra.ther than by military means
which would awaken the British sporting spirit.
1
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T.Qe Eastward Drive

·

ARTNERSHIP .is the card Hitler plays anywhere
where he sees the possibUity of bringing a
nation · under his · rule without having first
fought and conquered it. Nowadays .such partnership implies adherence to the tripartite pact, and
then~with a willingness to fit in with Hitler's "New
Order."'
Rumania and Bulgaria have chosen this ·
partnership in preference to the horrors of invasion.
It has been offered to Yugoslavia and ~urkey.
Hitler wants to have Spain and France as
partners, but the best example of his partnerships is
shown by Italy. There we may see the genuine
characteristics of Hitler's partnerships which have
already proved the undoing of the former ruling
classes in Germany which became Hitler's· German
parfoers.
·
·
He looks for partners all over the w.orld. He seeks
them in-the Near East, and the promises. he makes to
prospective ones sound plausible enough because he
always employs the tactics of pr9mising what he doE;s
not intend to keep, i.e.;' complete sovereignty for all
nations and races formerly. in the Fr·e nch sphere of
influence or still in the British one. He has promised
a Greater Arabia an_d the union of all Mohammedan
peoples in· a Panislamic Federation.
These baits are similar to those which he offered
when he proClaimed that hi~ sole desire was to lib-
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erate the German nation from the shackles of Versailles. In the Near East there are motives which
would seem to give credence to his political intentions, but it is easy to see through his .real aims. He
is striving to obtain key points, for the destruction of
the British Empire and the establishment of his own
National Socialist world dominion. These include
the acquisition of that· important raw material . . .
I
petroleum.
Hitl er is wont to explain to his intimates that a
nation can only become a world power when it has
access to the open sea. His political thoughts soon
went beyond the narrow continental conceptions . of
the Germans and envisaged access to the Pacific as
well as the Atlantic. That was the r·e al significance
of his colonial claims before the war and is behind
his Near Eastern policy. He was to gain· a footing
in the Pacific in order to acquire Britain's heritage
there.
The argument put forward by his friends that
Germany must first become a great sea · power was
always brusEed aside by him ;vith the assertion that
he foresaw great changes of colonial possessio:ps
which would be effected by means of along series -of
political, revolutionary, and military actions. To his
enthusiastic listeners of ten years ago he explained
his reasons for this assertion by conjiuring up mos!
incredible visions of the future.
· He was mainly interested in the revolutionary
process of disintegration which he boasted he could
easily set in motion anywhere.
The old empires
must be destroyed by means of a " domination idea,"
as he used to term it, rather than by the external
actions of aircraft and ·troops. No nation could take
-
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over the inheritance of an older power unless it was
imbued with this idea.
'

The fall of the ancient, self-disintegrating British
Empire would be the rise of the new w orld power of ·
Germany. It was necessary to loc'a te the points where
the p:i;ocess <of disintegration was aiready visibly·
active, and try to entice within the German sphere
of infh; ence those component , parts which w~re
already striving for independence.
This could be
done by means of offers of partnership.

I,

If 'it proved ~mpossible to accomplish , this by
peaceful methods, then it wc,mld be necessary to try
to separate them from .their prew ous overlords by
means of a series of abrupt violent blows. For this
purpose he would need to gain a footing at the most
important points as soon as possible, so that he could
strike at the most favourable political moment.
Thus a drive through the Balkans towards a Turkey
brought on to his side by means of inner_revolution
should give him possession of the Suez Canal keypoint, after he had subjected the Arabian and Syrian
territories, along with Irak, Iran, and Egyp~.
Hitler left it an open question whether he should
shape his policy temporarily towards an aj.liance
with Britain, i.e., become her junior partner, or enter
into open hostility against her as Germany's enemy.·
Among his intimates Hitler expressed himself
cynically and frivolously concerning the ways by
which a partner might be ousted. He was firmly
conv inced that he would be· able to win over a large
part of the population of Britain to his side. He
boasted of his ability to make the i?ensible part of
the English race see the nonsense of giving the fella-
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heen and nomad tribes of the.Near East a dem0cratic
order and political independence.
\
.
To create new rnitional entities among the
• coloured peoples was, he opined, such -an obvious
fQlly and so contrary to Nature that no thoughtful
Englishman could possible agree to it. Tnese tribes
of the Near East resp-e cted only a strong Government and despised a humane one. He wo'ild give
them their ft.II of the only liberty they wanted, which
was the liberty to plunder and make · war on one
another. It was not a question of training up hybrid
forms of new nations, s~ch as ·the Egyptians, but
merely of buying up a couple of tribal chiefs and
playing them off against each other.
Whichever way Hitler might seek to carry out
his .policy-whether as Britain's ally, as he would
have preferred, or as her enemy, whkh is the case
now-only the political motivations are changed, but
not the -actual National Socialist aims.
'
Hitler's objective . remains the subjugation of all
"coloured" peoples in Asia Minor and North Africa
as a preliminary stage .to the accomplishment of the
new world empire he 'proposes to create from the
secedir:ig members of the British and French Empires.
All the nations and races to which he promises
independence and a -glowing future in his secre~ pro_paganda are to him nothing more than material for
his machinery of domination. They will form the
subjected classes which have to do the rough work
while possessirig no right to an independent political
existence.
In H)tler's opm10n enormous possibilities open
up for him when he has conquered the Near East.

From frak and Iran he can attack Russia's ·vulnerable
flank. With a' footing on the Persian Gulf he is on
the threshold of the Far East; there also he can control Egypt, and the route down the east coast' of the
African continent. But will he once more receive the
decisive offers of help from the very nations he
intends to subjugate?
The secret -of Hitler's success is something pr~
foundly d~moniacal. Hitherto he has always, contrive~ to induce the victims of his struggle for power
to put 'themselves voluntarily in his power.
We havei not yet reac,:hed the- end of this path of .
self-deception.

-
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TJle Nazi New' Social Order ·

ITLER has another aim besides the external
subjection of the world to his rule. He has the.
idea of a new world social order. The two aims
are closely connected with one another, bec,ause a
special form of domination must 'be evolved if his
claim to world rule is not to remain a mere fantasy.
It was the apparently logical impossibility of a
permanent domination by external means of power
which deceived so many sensible politicians of subjected nations into hoping that the National Socialist
rule could not be so bad because it was self-contradictory. , National Socialism needs 'the co-operation
of the nations it has subjected, and sooner or later
1jhe empire founded on dictatorship must revert to
more liberal forms of government.
But Hitler has other notions about h{s means and
intentions to dominate the world.
Hitler talks of " Herrenvolker" (ruling races) .
The world's .H errenvolk consists of the mysterious
Aryans, of which the apparently Nordic Germans
form the nucleus. But that is only one aspect of his
remarkable doctrine, for it follows that if there is
to be a ruling race it must ne,c essarily have subjected slave races under it. In the opinion of the
National Socialists all races except these A~yans are
slave races. It goes without question that all
coloured peoples, all Semites, and all the l)ations of
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the ancient Mediterranean culture and their inheritors of to-day belong to the slave. races.
The preachers of such a doctrine cannot admit the
equality of man or the liberation of oppressed races·
they can only envisage absolute and - unascendabl~
steps in an order of rank.
An order of rank-that does not .s ound so bad
especially as we know ,t hat the vital wisdom of th~
ancient nations of the East found expression in an
order of rar:k. Superficial ·equality can be a very
dangerous gift, as. can also be that constructive reason
which seeks to rebuild the world according to its owh
pattern.
·
But Hitler's doctrine of a dominating ·ra'ce ruling
slave masses of subject races or-to give it a more
civilised interpretation-a privileged class ruling the
masses of the pqpulation has found open and secret
supporters all over the world.
These supply the
convinced advocates of National Socialism in all
countries who are generally the leaders of the Fifth
Columns in them.
These persons regard Hitler's
doctrine as a renovation of the world by the drawing
of hard and fast distinctions between the rulers
among whom they include themselves, and the'
masses, wit,h whom they class all others and, above
all, their opponents and competitors:
How simple it would be to solve all our most difficult P,roblems if we could merely · suppress the
troublesome, dangero_us revolts of the masses by
reason of the will of the strong and powerful who
really had· the courage to make themselves .lords of
the earth! So all the combinations of interests and
social classes which have suffered social and
-
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economic reverses from the political an~ s0cial onslaughts of the new industrial social order, become
secret or open adherents of Hitler's doctrine of ruling
classes and their rights over their weaker brethren.
Hitler's ·world order does not by any means imply
the rule of German National Socialism-so they whisper to one another-but rather the restoration of th~
old order which was ousted for a time by false demo'
cratic notions of liberty and equality.
This natural order means the right of the strange~
over the weaker, the victory of the ruling class over
the revolting masses. All who profess the 1;:reed of
National Socialism and become its partners-so
Hitler's adherents proclaim-will share the benefits
of his new order. Hitler is not interested in maintaining permanently the subjugation of the countries.
he has occupied, but rather in their internal order and
in their incorporation in his great new order.
I believe that no part of Hitler's secret doctrine
has caused so much mental perplexity as this 'belief
i~ the rights of the ruling men, which is the real
nucleus of his popular racial theory .and its brutal
anti-Semitism. There is a grain of truth in such interpretations, and anyone who does not scrutin~se
them closely will fail to locate the boundaries
between this truth and his deliberate misleading.
Hitler will certain:ly take his adherents among the '
subjected or allied nations into . his rulirig class and
new international nobility. He will ,allow certain
Norwegians, Dutchmen, Belgians, perhaps even
Frenchmen, and possibly Rumanians, to share the
benefits of the ruling class of his great empire.
But for what pur'pose? He would certainly not
lea~e the subjected countries under the sway of their

.
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own ruling .classes which he h~s made his protegee~,
because in course of time they might develop once
more intQ independent political classes. He would
be far mor e likely to use his devoted adherents in the
conquered lands as means for more effective ter. rodsati:on. They would be the · bailiffs and poiice
that would render his p~rmanent sway possible, but
these new leaders would enjoy no powers of respon·
sibility and independent qecision. They would, ili
fact, be the most abject slaves of all in the s lave
na.tions.
'
No military conqueror has been able to maintain
his conquests in the long ru11 if he rnled them solely
J:>y the .s word. By taking natives of every country
into his r uling ·elite, Hitler
would create . a ruling
i
class which would be absolutey dependent upon him,
because it could only rule as long as he ruled, and
would'therefore be forced by self-interest to do every.
th,i ng in its power to maintai>n its rule. Its members
would know that their lives were only safe as long _
as they remained under the protection of the
conqueror.
The trick by ·which Hitler believes himself able
to found an end~ring world dominion is the identification of the i'nteresits of certain classes in the conquered countries with his own. Consequently, the
governments which were dependent upon him
would prove themselves to be the best administrators
of National Socialist supremacy and would save him
the trouble of occupying_ and policil].g these terriJ
tori es.
This is merely a large-scale development ·of Jhe
system he has tried out in Germany. The egoistic
I

~
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interests of his -new nobility are so clo.sely linked
with the maintenance of his own supremacy that
those who turn against him would be bo~nd to lose
their lives, or at least their means of existence.
The theory of ruling and slave classes has, theref~re only one purpose, i.e., to make Germany master
of the world, with slave overseers chosen fro~ ~he
subjected nations.
There is nothing astomsh:ng
about. this primitive 'm ethod, which other ;co!1<_iuen~g
nations have employed in_attempts to mamtam ~h_eir
conquests in perpetuo, but what is really surpnsmg
is the self-deception of the conquered, ':ho do not
realise what is happening to them.
.
In almost every nation we can find_ cla,s ses which
eagerly embrace the opportunity to wm .success a:id
resi:iect by doing the hack' work for a new social
1
doctrine.

-
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Political Seduction
T is not merely to the wealthy a.n d ruling classes
that Hitler applies the political seduction with
which he hopes to break his opponents' morale.
He devotes much attenticm to others besides those
, which are receptive audiences for his slogan of
" Master in your own House,'' because they go in dread of los~ng their property and influence.
Long before the collapse of France-even before
the outbreak of war-he made a successful appeal to
the commonsense of the man in the street, to the
French petit bourgeois. He address~d himself to ,__the
lovers of peace, to the '' gloire " of the past, to the
France "who cannot bear to see her childreI1 weep."
He knew how to appeal to the sensible point of view
which deemed another war nonsensical and contrived
to pose successfully as the man 9f humble origin who
realised the troubles of the little man and sympathised with them.
,
Why must there be 'a war, he argued. ·The nations
could reach an understanding in a ·twinkling of an
eye; good will could solve all problems. So why go
to war again? No country wanted it. No one aid,
except the' political cliques. Elect leaders who really ·
represent your sound, natural interests and clear out
-the corrupt gangs which are dragging you against
your will into war and fresh sacrifices!
Naive as this propaganda may ~eem, it had its
effect: Before the war the goss,ip in any barber's

I
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shop, in any public-house, in the streets, at the
markets, and with the concierges frequently_. ran on
this line: "Hitler is a man of the people!
Hitler
really doesn't want war! If only France had a
Hitler!"
Hitler's unconscious propagandists were not only
to be found in high society or in the ranks of the industrialists, financiers, and political reactionaries
who hailed him as their champion and admired his
greatness, as a French doctor did in my presence with
some display of passion before the war.. The masses
went into action with the feeling that they were
being called upon for. unnecessary sacrifices. This
is not our war, they argued, we did not want it, w~
were not attacked. It is-the fault of our incompetent
politicians. Call it off, and give us peace.
The propaganda with which the National Social~
ist's subsequently contrasted the large size of the
French Army with the alleged almost non-existent
British Expeditionary Force in order to intensify the
war's unpopularity was almost superfluous. The
foundations of Franc@'s moral collapse were laid long
before the war.
Undoubtedly a large part of the Frerich Army
fought bravely; if France had been spared military
- d~feat, she might perhaps have :o vercome her moral
crisis. But the catastrophe w.h ich developed from
defeat had its roots in the pre-war infection of the
collective subconscious: It rendered impossible that
last greaf national effort which might have perhaps
averted surrender at the very last momerit, just as·
the Battle of the Marne did.
But Hitler sounded another note in his mass pro;
-

50 -

POLITICAL SEDUCTION

paganda. It was no mer·e chance that Marxism the
doctrinair:e socialism of Europe, showed itself s· ~ incapable of resistance. Even leaders such as Henri de
Man . in Belgium and Stauning in Denmark (to say
nothmg of the French socialists.) adapted themselv·es
very quickly to National Socialist policy. It was ·
not merely a result of the Russo-German Pact that
sub_versive activities of the communists in France
(and not only in France) became almost identical
with the underground National Socialist propaganda.
Hitler usurped the motive of popular Marxism.
Not only did he ally his pr opaganda to theirs as
we may see from his latest slogans which characte~ise
"gold and capitalism" as the main enemy, but he
actually· abolished the liberal, social, and economic
order along with that which is termed capitalism.
The concrete idea which forces itself into the
consciousness of many older Marxists is that Hitler
is the liquidator of the old, decayed, middle-class
world. They feel they cannot and must not obstruct
his liquidation work.
.
Repulsive though the man and his political notions
may be, his brutal methods cleq.r the way for reasonable progress, and the future socialist world order.
T?erefore, ~very class-c:_onscious worker must give
his sympathies to Hitler; it is his business to ensure
that no complete victory .of the middle-class forces
should hinder the legitimate development towards
the world socialism which is the great irrevocable
aim of history after the transifion period of Hitler
and Mussolini.
In their own q~ibb~ing ~ay of constructing history
many of the Marxian mtelhgentsia of all shades have
-51-

POLITICAL SEDUCTION

already mapped out the historfcal development and
anticipated the future. For them National Socialism
and the war represent ,only the hastened catastrophic
final period of the self-destruction of the middle~
class capitalistic society.
But the masses put their own interpretation on it.
They want to obtain that ~odicum of security ~ith
out which their lives are rendered intolerable. '.They
have that "will to happi:µess" which became a political fact.or with the French Revolution. They are
ready to give up much in order'to enjoy security aml
" happiness."
·
1
Anyone who knows 'how to play on these desires
can achieve . much. Perhaps he can . master their
morale; although he cannot awaken other great forces
of spiritual life he can arouse enthusiasm for a great
secular task.
<J

-
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The Tui:ning Point
NE day Hitler's shock troops wi-11 ,b e as µseless
for offensive purposes as the Maginot Line was
for defens·i ve ones. Lines of deferfce can be
turned, but modern armies can be manoeuvred into·
~mmobility.
They can ·e ven manoeuvre themselves
to a standstill and then become operating · armies
without the power to operate.
One day Germany's railway junctions and huge
railway networks, Germany's oil' dumps and refineries and the important crossroads _of Germany's
"Aµtobahn" system will all be so.damaged by bombing from the air that they will become useless for
marching armies and their reinforcements.
,
. Tank squadrons will begin to run short of oil, and
the airman will be chained to the ground. But the
Germ~n Generc:il Staff will not recognis·e the hopelessness of the position untif matters have reached
this pitch:
·
.,
·
, There is, · however, another factor which shackles
the German forces. · Every fresh occupation of territory evokes a manifestation of the process known p.s
the "thinning out of 'the fron_t line."
Despite the efforts of the Gestapo and Quislings,
large troop· contingents are required· for the " interior theatre of war." They will become continually more important in considerations of strategy . . ,
The "Inside Germany" theatre of war has lost its
significance £or some time after ' the victories of the

0
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previous year, but it will become important again
when bombing raids and the absence of new victories
begin to cause the growth. of unrest . and passive
resistance.
This does not imply that Hitler need fear open
revolts in Germany, but growing resistance, sabotage,
boredom, and ap~thy are bound to cause him alarm.
Perhaps the other interior theatres of war are
more likely to cause military trouble. In addition to
those comprised ill France, Belgium, Holland, Poland,
Czecho-Slovakia, and Norway, he .has now to reckon
with ' an interior Italian theatre of war.
If it is
correct that 300,000 German troops are already in
Italy, he has to face a noteworthy " extens~on of the
front."
The Balkans will put a further strain on the supplies of German reserves, which are by no means
inexhaustible. ·The German General Staff and political leaders must prepare for serious . rebellions
which might break out simultaneously in several interior theatres of war and thus obstruct the movements of Germ;m forces.
On,e day there might be a rent in the network of
occupation forces.
But if the illusion of the
enemy's strength wanes in even one of the countri~s
where the German Government stak~s everything on
its power to terrorise the inhabitants, disaster can
no longer be staved off. Panic and terror will then
move to the other side.
All of a sudden we might see that the National
Socialist colossus rests on feet of clay. One day it
will become evident that all Germany's, apparently
so mighty achieve,ments count for nothing, because
___:. 54 -

THE TURNING POINT

they constitute a single enterprise which! is " against
the nature of things. "
Hitler was right to laugh at his literary critics
,who chalked up so many bad marks for his political
mistakes and miscalculations.
He could point o'u t
contemptuously that he has made ten times or even
a hundred times as many mistakes as thos·e imputed ·
to him. Politics and warfare live on mistakes made
by both sides. How could the vast enterprise which
National Socialism has undertaken be carried out
without mistakes?
Individual mistakes do not count. But one cardinal point is decisive, according to Hitler's calculations, and· according to the" calculations of others.
What these wretched psychologists who are kno~n
as the German Ge_neral Staff are doing is not merely
something more or less " against the natur~ of
things," It is the cardinal . error against which
General von Clausewitz, the great teacher of the
Prussian General Staff, warned them.
·Slowly but irresistibly the doom of the German
nation ' rises above the horizon. All the vast charlatanry of the whole artificial machinery of Germany is beginning to show up. The world cannot
be permanently ruled by . terror, violence, and enslavement._
This new Germany has been conjured out of a
chemical retort. It was .not a group of political
- Utopians and planners who began to clothe mankind
according to the needs of their theories. It was the
German militarists who profited by the experiences
of the world war whieh they lost to concoct in the
psychological laboratories · a recipe for winning the
next one
this time without a " stab in the
-
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back" and the meddling· of " · c~vilians," who always
had one eye on peace and the other on a comwom~se.
- A nation can bear the unbearable for. a very long
time'. But it must believe in the necessity ~or its
sacrifices. If it begins to doubt and to ask the reason ·
of this or that then all resistance powers break down.
Then· the situation .suddenly becomes intolerable.
National Socialism has done everything that discipline, terrorisatio~, brutal and refined coII)pulsion,
and brutal and refined seduc.t ion cari do to a nation
which is 'so easy to discipline and deceive, but it
has been unable to inspire it with faith in the necessity ·for further sacrifices.
So long as one victory followed another, so long
as the war remained a_ remote spectacular drama
performed outside the national frontiers, the nation
was read·y to put up with certain things. Every
natioI) is cajoled by outward success 1 but Germans
will change their minds as 'soon as a war~as
. ubiquitous as modern wars are-suddenly raises its
destructive head in their country. Then the artificiality of the imposed discipline and the weakr.i.esses of
this whole order-hitherto masked by compulsory
measures-will emerge into daylight.
Twenty-five years ago large numbers of the German people' honestly believed that Germany was
attacked and that they were forced to defend ihem- _
selves. It was. this belief which enabled Germany
to carry on through the long war years; but no such
belief inspires· the German people to-day. Yet with- . _
out it they can:p.ot :withstand the terrors of aerial
bombardment and other crises of a spiritual nature.
· Th~n one day the German youth will refuse to
carry on. Perhaps people here have false notio~s
·-
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of the fanaticism of this German youth and its faith
in the Fii.hter.
Undoubtedly, there are fanatfcal,
young Germans, but in the mass of young men, of
military age such enthusiasm is only an out:ward
show. _All these young fellows have passed through.
the school of Nihilism'. The higher they climbed in
the ra,nks of the Hitler Youth the more cynical and
sceptic;al' the.i r outlook became. They want to enjoy
the life of the "Herrenvolk" which .was ·promised
them. "So we are to die? And for what? No, we
are not quite so . stupid as that! " This is the real
opinion of the apparently heroic younger generation,
out of which everything has been drilled except the
will to power and endurance of hardships.
Even though t9.ese military men and their
National So~ialist auxiliaries have devised a cun-·
ning mass psychology they are bad psychologists.Despite all their. propaganda ~ the masses :will not
hold out. Sooner or later they will answer all the
screeching appeals of their Nazi leaders with passive
resistance.
. But even. the "Elite" will not hold out when' it
comes to the sacrifice of their own persons. The will
to power can· no more create ethical qualities than
crass materialism can suddenly develop into the
flower of nobil_ity. _·
Those men who pull the strings in Germany are
bad psychologists. They over-estimate and underestimate human beings simultaneously.
One day there will be another August 8, 1918.
Then it will not be merely the armies that go on
strike, as we saw then, but· the whole nation will
refuse to carry on. When that happens, C!nd when
the spell of terror is broken, as was the spell · of
-
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obedience in that August, the leaders will be impotertt. No power on earth will be able to ·procure
obedience to their orders.
No one can say when this will take place. Perhaps
a great shock will be necessary before this -turn of
events sets in. It is easy to imagine that the
enormous sacrifice of life which an attempt to invade
Britain would involve might provide this shock.
When in the course of the invasion of Norway a
German transport went down and the oil in it suddenly caught fire, so that t!iousands.of young German
soldiers had to fight against the flames and the sea
for their lives, the horrors of this experience infected
the whole army. It may be that a similar experience
would bring about the psychological turning point.
Perhaps it is the fear of such a turning point
which causes the Germa;n General Staff to hesitate
to give the order for invasion. No one knows when ,
the turning point will occur, but it is as certain as
.t he sequence of day and night that it will occur. And
au fond the German military me11-know this. It is
their secret nightmare; it is that which they strive
to prevent by all possible means, but which must
neverth.eless occur, because it is "in the nature of
things."
,
It is the reaction to the long violation of Nature.

-
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Japan and the German System
FTER the Great War Japan was not popular with
the Germans. They could not forget the drama, tic
way in which she came in on !he side of the
Allies. The emotional note in politics which dorriin- ated the masses in the days of imperial Germany led
to a general belief that, as .t he " Prussia of the Far
East,'' Japan would fight on the German side. The di~
appointment was as great as that whic~ was exp.enenced when Italy, the third partner m the Triple
Alliance, joined the enemy. ·
·
But the men in Germany's background who
always calculated the charic;es for a resumption of
the war broken off in 1918 and a final victory were
not at all pleased by this resentment a'gainst Japan.
The machinery whkh had broken down in the previous war would have to work smoothly in the next
one. Japan ought to be on the yerman side, they
_ argued, and it was inore :important to win her over
. than even to gain the support of Italy.
This can only be understood if we gain 'a clear
insight into the political system which the men in
the background and, above all, the military men,
deemed to be a necessary framework for their war
operati'ons. There was the theory of a western
orienta~ion, by which Britain and the U.S.A. would
become Germany's protector;s in her rise to equality
of status as a world Power.
13ut this would have involved a slower rise, because there wa~ only one way of winning over the

A
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Anglo-Saxon democracies, i.e., by fitting in with their
political order, which, in turn, would 'have involved
the renunciation of many of Germany's national
ambitions. It might have meant a total renunciation.
It was hardly to be expected that the great democracies would drop France. They were unlikely to
allow any interference-with French territory, and so
it seemed highly improbable that Germany could
look for any extension of her boundaries in a
· westerly direction.
.
So there was another school of thought which envisaged a final. "settlement" with France and her
elimination as a military Power as the corner-stone
in the edifice of Germany's world dominion. This
implied the risk of complications with Britain, and
eventually with the U.S.A.
But this might bring
about a repetition of the 1914 coalition against Germany, with the same ominous declarations of war"
against her. How could such a catastrophe be prevented.
The prevention :of an anti-German coalition de~
pended on tw0 factors.
The large-scale scheme of
mi~itary operations envisaged by the National
Socialists would have to b~ broken up into a series
of individual operations, which would have to .be carried· out successfully by short, sharp blows which
would check the possibility of unified attack on
• Germany. The example which Hitler kept in his
mind's ·e ye was the Austro-Prussian War of 1866,
which came to its military and political end so
quickly that France's threatened intervention could
riot take place.
Bismarck, whom he regarded as the classic
master, had divided· the so-called 0-erman "war of
unification" into three separate· series of military
-
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operations, interspaced by peace treaties, and in this
way a hostile coalition might be prevented by isolating each action.
But the division of the total plan into separate
phases was not a sufficient guarantee of success. It
therefore -seemed necessary to anticipate the formation of a coalition by winning over to the German
side several important members · of the coalition
which wa~ formed in 1914-18.
Each of the principal members of a possible
~coalition, i.e., Britain, France, and the U.S.A., would
have to be offset by a new German ally. Thus we
may see the well-known "eastern orientation" of
German politics, for which tile German generals may
perhaps I;>ear an even greater responsibility than
Hitler.
The enticement of Russia ·into a German
system of alliances was no mere sentimental harking
back to Bismarck's policy of" safeguarding the rear,"
but an elementary necessity ii the German leaders
were to throw over the policy of coming to terms
with the we;tern Powers and substitute o~e which
involved the risk of war with France.
, ' This " ·e astern ,orientation " is an instance ' Of cod
c~iculation; it does not signify arty real friendship
with Russia, but rather the exploitation of that
country.. The first signs of it became visible when
German officers returned fr:om visits to Russia with
wholehearted ·enthus~asm for the way in- which
everything was done for the armed forces there and
the absence of complications with " civilian factors "
which w~re found i-n German ·democraci:
No real .light has· ever · been shed on tlre alleged
conspiracy of 'the . Reichswehr with .. certain . leading
Russian military circles (Tuchachevsky)' for the pu1r-
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pose of replacing the political dictatorships in both
countries by military ones, but .we may regard this
as merely a.n attempt to qbtain better s·afeguards for
the '. 'eastern orientation." This policy, however,
includes Japan as well as Russia.
without Japan on her side Germany would lack
the one real offset to ·the intervention of the U.S.A.
in favour of Britain and France. This was the deduction of the men who had to say the final word in
Germany, although they failed to foresee that Japan's
appearance on the .German side was the one thing
which would popularise war againpt Germany in the
U.S.A. But could Japan be 'won over? Could Japan
be br~ught to act in concert with Russia? It seemed
to be a problem as hard ,as squaring the circle.
. - Despite 'all difficuities an attempt was made. One
of the big inen in the background who had thought
out this scheme and were beginning to accomplish
it by devious means was a certain c;razy general whom
the Weimar Republic .had made a university professor. This was Max Haushofer, who became the _geopolitician ctnd president of the German Academy in
Munich: He knew Japan well. In pre-war days he had- written'. a book about Japan. Later he became
one of· the main advocates of that remarkable semiscience known as" geopolitics,'' by which every policy
: is decided in advance according to the nature of the·
territorial 'spaces and their " lines and fields of
power."
·
It was Haushofer-whose pupil, incidental.ly, was
Hess, H,i tler's deputy and most intimate adviser-who
converted a useable auxiliary discipline into an apparently infallible system and an ostensibly ~cientific
d~ctrine of Germany's future wo,rld domin~tion and
I
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the inevitable downfall .of the British Empire. It
exercised a more decisive influence on the political
opinions of the leaders of the Third .Reicb than ~a,lL
their party programmes and racial theories.
Success attended Germany'p efforts to eliminate
the former antagonism and resentment between Japan
and Russia !md bring their mutual interests into the
. foreground. We may make fun of the notion that
the Germans have promoted the Japanese to honorary eastern Aryans, and for a .time far-fetched
attempts were made in Germany to prove that at least
Japan's ruling classes were of· Nordic origin.
The similarity- between the' coats of arms of the
Samurai and the European nobility was an instance
which was1 adduced. Moreover, Japan's worship of
the State, with . its consequent deification of the
Emperor, exercised a not inconsiderable influence _
on the intellectuals of certain German circles, who
saw an esoteric doctrine of the pop_ular racial theory
in itsJparallels with the new German religion. It, did
much to influence German officers in favour of this
new religion.
To-day we may see the ripening of these fruits which
were cultivated so carefully for almost two decades.
Japan is a member of the Axis, and the National
Socialist leaders are about to assign~'to her the part
they have 10ng desired her to play, i.e., the immooilisat-ion of the U.S.A. and assistance in the destruction
of the British Empire. But what then?
Hitler's maxim that alliances are generally only
war alliances for mutual gaip. is so naive that it is
probably true. At the moment Germany and Japan
'may have common interests in the overthrow of a
-
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c:ommon · enemy. But that is the· only .thing : they
have in common. Japan will consider the question
· of future oppqrtunities in alliance with a victorious
Germany and ask herself whether the presence of '. a
" dynamic " Germany in the Pacific Ocean will o'ffer
greater guarantees for her free · dev elopment t.h an
the two Anglo-Saxon Powers can give.
··
.
A clear, definite division of the great spaces be'tween victorious totalitarian Powers wo;uld he very
improbable, National Socialism has alre::idy .an,.
nounced its claims to Australia, New · Zealand; the .
Dutch East Indies,. and Oceania. The Pacific Ocean
is ~ 'the decisive world sea" in German phantasy. A
victorious Germany would never leq.ve Japan in 'sole
control of this world sea: But there is ·another factOr
of uncertainty , which Japan must take info accoupt.
) tis, undotl°btedly-, the ~anifest impr~bability of a
German victory in the event of active par_tidpation in
the war· by the. U.S.A. which gives these calculating
politicians food for' thought.. But they are also in:
fiuenced by the internal ·weakness of .this Geqnany
who has gained spurious prestige by erroneous over, ·
estimation of a cl;tea p victory, for they , know that this
weakness may become as apparent ·to a serious opponent
the impotence of . bomb::].?tic I_taly to -w ithstar].d t"he blows of little Greece. . ·.
.
·. , '
If Japan . takes the wrong side, . might she . not
lose all the gains of a' century of strenuous efforts?The German-Japanese allian~e resembles a . marriage
in which the two pa~tners are competing as to. \Yhich
shall be the first . to divorce tlie ,o ther. AH appear-.
point
to the _probability
that
this will. he, Japari_.
ances
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